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HOT Emotions: Dissolving the Paradox of Fiction
  Katherine Tullman 
Abstract
This essay critiques two of the main theories in the philosophy
of emotions, the pure-cognitive theory and the neo-Jamesian
theory, through the paradox of fiction.  After explaining the
different kinds of emotions we experience when engaging with
fictions, I argue that a middle-ground, hybrid theory more
adequately accounts for current scientific research and the
paradox of fiction than either of the previous two.  I propose a
“HOT” theory of emotions (higher-order thought) specifically
to explain complex emotions about fictions.
Key Words
emotion, higher-order thoughts, James-Lange theory of
emotions, judgment theory of emotions, paradox of fiction,
thought-theory of emotions
1.  “Nobody can eat fifty eggs”
It’s another rainy day in prison, and the boys are getting
restless.  One inmate casually claims that he can eat fifty
eggs.  The bored prisoners place bets; the man’s eager
“trainer” grabs the cash.  You watch on, at first in anticipation
—can he do it?  Surely nobody can eat fifty eggs—then
disgust as his belly swells up “like a watermelon” as the man
forces down egg after egg, and finally, with a subtle pride,
admiration and pity for this brave man as he lies forgotten by
his peers, arms spread like Christ on the cross.
Except, of course, that this “hero” isn’t real.  Many readers will
know him as the maverick protagonist of Cool Hand Luke
(1967) played by Paul Newman.  But weren’t our emotions
real?  Your reaction was sincere; the gagging sensation in your
throat physically present.  You empathized with Luke’s sacrifice
and nonchalance throughout his ordeal and resent the other
prisoner’s greed.  These emotions vary from the simple and
reactionary (disgust) to the rationally complex (pride and
empathy).
The question of whether it is possible to experience emotional
reactions towards fictional entities is often characterized in
terms of the paradox of fiction.  Traditionally, three
propositions comprise this discordant triad:
            1. We are genuinely moved by fictions;
            2. We know that that which is portrayed in 
                fictions is not actual; and
            3. We are only genuinely moved by what we 
                believe is actual.[1]
This paradox reveals an inconsistency in our emotional
responses to fictional entities and situations.  At the heart of
this inconsistency lies an assumption about the nature of
emotions:  what causes emotions and what they are comprised
of.  Taken together, these three premises are a hurdle for any
leading theory of emotions:  pure-cognitive theories, non-
cognitive theories, or hybrid theories.  Simply put, cognitive
theorists hold that emotions are constituted by some form of
cognition:  beliefs, judgments, thoughts, and so on, though
the particular form varies by theory. Non-cognitivists, in
contrast, hold that such mental states do not constitute an
emotion; rather, either a perception or bodily response to
stimuli is the emotion.  Hybrid theories are a mixture of the
two:  both some form of cognition and bodily responses are
necessary components of emotions.
The Cool Hand Luke example above reveals another intuition
underlying the paradox.  When engaging in a fiction, we are
moved not only by sensory stimuli in the art media, like
reactions to sudden noises, sharp movements, and bright
colors, but also by the work’s narrative.  As stated, these
emotions range from the seemingly cognitively complex to the
automatic and subconsciously realized.
Any theory of aesthetic emotions must explain the paradox of
fiction and this intuition about the breadth of our emotional
responses in order to serve as an adequate account of our
affective responses towards fictional entities. Furthermore, a
theory of emotions in general must do the same; I take the
paradox as a paradigm of sorts concerning one significant
aspect of our emotional repertoire.  I argue that the pure-
cognitive theory, held most notably by Martha Nussbaum and
Kendall Walton, fails on this account.  At the same time,
strictly non-cognitivist theories of emotions also cannot
adequately explain our experiences with fictions, especially in
terms of more complex emotions.
My goal is to supplement a non-cognitivist theory with another
component that solves the paradox and explains the above
intuitions while still maintaining a strong foundation in a
general theory of emotions:  a middle-ground, hybrid theory
that encompasses the full range of our emotional responses
toward fictions.  To this end, I will argue that the typically
troublesome case of complex emotions to fictions are best
understood in terms of a higher-order thought-theory of
emotions in which one must have an intentional evaluation or
belief concerning a thought that is itself the formal object of
the emotion.[2]  As we’ll see, though, I will explain the role
that thoughts play in the emotional process in a slightly
different way from other hybrid theories. 
2.  Fiction’s emotions proper
Engaging with fictions can elicit different types of emotions
from an audience.  Many of these emotions include involuntary
or subconscious affect responses, such as increased heart rate
or involuntary screams.  We can also have more complex
emotions, such as jealousy or empathy, which seem to require
conscious thought.  Somewhere in between lie the more basic
emotions, such as joy and anger. We may often be aware of
these feelings as well as what causes them, but not always.
Which of these types of emotions does the paradox address? 
Since the first type, the automatic emotional responses,
happen involuntarily, it might seem that they should not be
included as genuine emotions.  Noël Carroll describes the
involuntary or sub-cognitive affect responses and moods as
“cognitively impenetrable,” taking place on a level not
accessible to or affected by one’s reason or other cognitive
resources.  For example, “despite the fact that you know that
you are not in danger [while watching a film], your body will
respond otherwise and prepare you affectively for flight or
some other self-protective behavior.  Adrenaline will rush into
your veins as we are primed for action.  Furthermore, this high
can be enjoyable—can be savored—if there really is no real
danger in the vicinity.”[3]  In other words, we will have these
responses whether we know that we are in real danger or not.
 Such responses can be brought about by sudden noises or
movements in a film, musical composition, or play.  The startle
response is an example of a sub-cognitive reaction common to
films—especially horror films—because they induce the right
kind of affective response in the audience, the fearful “flight or
fight” reaction which Carroll describes.
The philosopher Carl Plantinga provides an interesting example
of these automatic affective responses.  He argues that films
often evoke an emotional response by using certain techniques
that emphasize emotions displayed in the human face.[4]
 Plantinga bases his argument on the influential work of the
psychologist Paul Ekman, who proposed that there are six
universal emotions (anger, fear, enjoyment, sadness, disgust,
surprise), each of which can be recognized by specific, cross-
cultural facial expressions.[5]  In cases of affective mimicry,
one automatically mimics another’s facial expression, posture,
motions, and so on. This, in turn, results in an automatic
affective response in the viewer.  Plantinga argues that a
similar situation occurs when engaging with films.[6]  A film
viewer responds to the emotions on an actor’s face that, if
performed well, will in turn evoke an emotion in the viewer,
either the same emotion, in the case of affective mimicry, or a
similar sympathetic emotion.
No philosopher denies that these sorts of automatic emotional
responses towards fictions take place.  The question is whether
they constitute real emotions.  Here, I argue, the distinction
between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of emotions
begins to become apparent.  The cognitivist view is that since
these automatic emotional responses are “cognitively
impenetrable,” not involving a conscious judgment or belief,
they are not real emotions.  If they aren’t real emotions, then
they are not the focus of the paradox of fiction.  Non-
cognitivist theories will deny this, as we’ll see, but for now we
can grant Carroll’s distinction.  Opposed to the automatic
responses, Carroll calls emotions such as anger, joy, sympathy
and pride “emotions proper” or “garden-variety” emotions
because they are the ones typically brought to mind in
reference to the term “emotion.”[7]  Although emotions such
as anger and joy may have characteristic bodily responses that
accompany them, the emotion itself is constituted by some
form of cognition, separating them from the automatic
affective responses.
Cognitive theories of emotions can also more fully explain the
distinction between basic emotions, such as anger and fear,
and more complex emotions, such as pride and envy. The
complexity of the emotion reflects the complexity of the
thought or judgment.  These may arise on account of our
contemplation of a story’s narrative or a character’s situation,
history, character flaws, and so on.  Consider the following
example.  One evening, I decide to watch a scary film.
 Unfortunately, the speakers on my television are not working,
so I watch the whole film without sound.  I don’t understand
what’s going on in the story, but I still see a monster sneak up
behind the film’s hero and I feel fear in response.  Would we
still respond emotionally to the character in a film if the sound
was turned off and we only saw the actress’s face but did not
know what caused her to show the tell-tale signs of fear?  We
may for some emotions—fear, perhaps, or disgust.  However,
in order to feel the complex emotions pity, sympathy, pride,
and so on, one would also have to consider the narrative as a
whole, and that information would be missing in this case. 
Imagine how we would react to Luke’s plight while he eats
those eggs if we didn’t know the context; we would certainly
be very confused if we didn’t know what was happening and
probably not feel the range of emotions that we do when we
are familiar with his plight.  This would suggest that some sort
of cognitive appraisal of the fiction is required for certain
emotions.
The paradox of fiction concerns all of these types of emotions,
from the basic to the complex.  Nevertheless, it’s important to
make the distinction between different kinds of emotions if we
want to be clear about the nature of the problem the paradox
poses for our understanding of fictions, because different
theories of emotions have different explanations for the
different types of emotions distinguished here.
3.  Cognitive vs. non-cognitive theories of emotion
Ultimately, my own view is to strike a balance between pure-
cognitive and purely non-cognitive theories of emotions,
forming a hybrid theory that explains the paradox in terms of
all three types of emotions discussed above.  To begin, I will
consider two theories of everyday emotions with which I
disagree on how they address the various types of emotions
and how the theory can be applied to fictions.
            3.1.  Pure-cognitive theories
Many philosophers have stated, more or less, that they adhere
to some form of cognitivist theory of emotions.  For example,
Kendall Walton argues “that fear necessarily involves a belief
or judgment that the feared object poses a threat is a natural
supposition which many standard theories of emotions
endorse.”[8]  It is the relevant belief or judgment that
constitutes the emotion, not the affective responses, though
those may accompany the belief.  Walton’s position is best
described as a pure-cognitive theory.  Only a certain type of
belief or judgment  is necessary for an emotion to obtain;
what type exactly, we’ll explore shortly.
Cognitivists argue that the cognitive element of emotions is at
least a necessary component of an emotion.  What separates
pure-cognitivists like Walton from hybrid theorists like Robert
Solomon and Noël Carroll, for example, is that they argue that
a belief, thought, or judgment is also sufficient for an
emotion;  it all that is required in order for an emotion to
obtain.  Martha Nussbaum, for example rejects the claim that
all emotions have a felt bodily response.  She argues that:
There usually will be bodily sensations involved in grieving, but
if we discovered that my blood pressure was quite low…or that
my pulse rate never went above sixty, there would not, I
think, be the slightest reason to conclude that I am not
grieving…We do not withdraw emotion-ascriptions otherwise
grounded if we discover that the subject is not in a certain
brain-state.[9]   
The important component of one’s grief is not a bodily change
or perception of that change, for such a response need not be
present for that emotion to occur.  In other words, bodily
changes are not a constitutive element of an emotion’s
identifying characteristics.  Instead, it is the judgment, belief,
or conscious recognition of something in our environment
affecting our well-being that constitutes the emotion.[10]  We
can imagine a situation similar to Nussbaum’s in which this is
possible.  I recently broke up with my boyfriend.  I have
confused thoughts, am distracted, and involuntarily think
about my ex but experience no bodily sensations relating to
my heartbreak.  Instead, my emotion results from a judgment
directed towards the confused thoughts that I experience.  As
Nussbaum argues, I still have the emotion even without bodily
sensations.  This seems especially fitting for long-term
emotions, such as love, pride or grief, which do not always
seem to include a felt bodily response to a situation.
Pure-cognitivists such as Nussbaum and Walton posit several
important claims about the nature of emotions.  The first
involves intentionality:  emotions are directed towards or are
about something in one’s environment.  Nussbaum argues that
emotions do not merely point out a formal object in one’s
environment but rather involve an internal and partial way of
seeing.[11]  I perceive an object in my environment as
causing my grief because of my unique perspective and way of
interpreting the world.  Solomon summarizes this point nicely:
All emotions presuppose or have as their preconditions…
certain sorts of cognitions—an awareness of danger in fear,
recognition of an offense in anger, appreciation of someone or
something as loveable in love.  Even the most hard-headed
neurological or behavioral theory must take account of the fact
that no matter what the neurology or the behavior, if a person
is demonstrably ignorant of a certain state of affairs or facts,
he or she cannot have certain emotions.[12]
Cognitivists also hold that emotions have to do with the
subject’s well-being.  As Nussbaum says, emotions are
“eudaimonistic,” having to do with the agent’s own flourishing
or the flourishing of those we care about.[13]  Finally, as
we’ve seen, emotions involve a belief or judgment about their
objects that causes bodily changes associated with the
emotion but which are not themselves a necessary component
of it.  These beliefs can be complex or simple.  Being afraid,
for example, involves the belief that an object, such as a
snarling dog, is dangerous and can do me harm. Guilt or
jealousy may involve very complex series of beliefs, such as I
might (falsely) belief that my partner is unfaithful and take
trivial events or objects in my environment as supporting that
belief.
Pure-cognitivist theories of emotions seem to be able to
handle many of our emotional responses, including those
concerning fictions.  Walton, and others, dissolve this paradox
by rejecting the first proposition.  We do not have genuine
emotions concerning fictions.[14]  We do have the automatic
affective responses towards fictions described above, which
might be why we feel like we have genuine emotions about
fictions.  But those feelings are misleading. We do not have
the right kind of belief about fictions to constitute a real
emotion; we don’t actually believe that a film monster can do
us or others harm, for example. We are merely caught up in
what Walton calls a “game of make-believe.”[15]
There are problems with this theory, however.  One argument
against pure-cognitivists has to do with the intentionality
component.  Nussbaum stresses that the beliefs involved in
emotion are “not trivial, but serious,”[16] meaning that to find
a situation frightening, the object must really be potentially
dangerous to me or someone I care about.  If the object of my
fear turns out not to be dangerous, then my fear will
subside.[17]  Consider our emotional response to the
protagonist in Cool Hand Luke.  While watching the film, one
might feel fear for Luke’s sake while he eats the eggs,
wondering whether or not he can possibly (safely) finish.  One
might also have a set of beliefs about Luke’s stubborn
personality, past actions, and current situation that all amount
to a feeling of anxiety on his behalf. The recognition, though,
that Luke is a fictional character should eliminate our belief
that he is in any real danger and thus eliminate the emotion,
which doesn’t seem to capture our actual experiences with
fictions.
Walton would argue, perhaps, that the reason the emotion
does not subside is that we are so caught up in our game of
make-believe with the fiction that we experience a wide-range
of make-believe emotions, even though we know that the
characters and situations aren’t real.  There’s a more pressing
concern with pure-cognitivist theories, though, stemming from
recent work in the neuroscience and biology of emotions
themselves.  While it might seem strange to appeal to
scientists when discussing fictions, emotions themselves are
cognitive or biological states.  A theory of emotions about
fictions should at least be in accord with general scientific
theories of emotions!
            3.2.  Two pathways of emotional processing
The neuroscientist Joseph Ledoux’s recent work on the brain
systems involved in emotional processing has shown that
there’s an affective or non-cognitive appraisal in emotions that
takes place below the level of awareness and produces
physiological changes in the subject.  In fact, many of our
emotions happen too quickly for cognitive evaluation, skipping
the cortex altogether, which is the part of the brain that
processes this information for higher-level thought.[18] In his
work on fear responses in rats, LeDoux has shown that
information about an emotional stimulus in one’s environment
reaches the amygdala, the part of the limbic system
associated with emotions, through a direct pathway from the
thalamus.  This information also goes through another, slower
pathway from the thalamus to the cortex, and then to the
amygdala.  Once the information reaches the amygdala from
either path, emotional responses occur.[19] This is significant
because the neocortex is associated with higher processing
systems, such as those involved with thought, reasoning, and
consciousness.  Why might we have two emotional pathways
instead of one?  The direct thalamic pathway is faster than the
cortical pathway, which allows for much quicker responses to
potential threats in our environment.  This is a major
advantage in terms of evolutionary fitness.  However, the
response from the thalamic pathway may be inaccurate, as
when we mistake a shadow for a predator.  This is where the
cortical pathway steps in.  LeDoux argues that the role of the
cortex is to prevent or stop an inappropriate emotional
response rather than to bring about a response:  a shift from
reacting to a stimuli to producing a conscious action.[20]
If LeDoux’s findings are correct, the pure-cognitivist’s claim
that beliefs constitute an emotion is undermined; emotions
can occur without one first having a belief about one’s
environment.  Of course, a pure-cognitivist could argue that
the quick, subcortical processing and responses don’t result in
genuine emotions; real emotions still may require the slower
beliefs.  Yet LeDoux argues that all of our emotions are based
on this sort of subcortical processing, which necessarily results
in felt bodily responses.  LeDoux argues that “feelings do
involve conscious content, but we don’t necessarily have
conscious access to the processes that produce the content.
 And even when we do have introspective access, the
conscious content is not likely to be what triggered the
emotional responses in the first place.”[21]  A pure-cognitivist
would be hard pressed to explain away these bodily responses
when arguing that only beliefs are necessary for emotions to
occur, and to explain why the response can occur without
being caused by a belief.
LeDoux’s findings may all be well and good for simple or
automatic emotions, such as fear or disgust.  But what about
the more complex emotions:  pride, jealousy, and so on?  As it
turns out, we can appeal to LeDoux’s model of emotional
processing here as well.  LeDoux identified two mechanisms at
work in the emotional process:  one automatic and fast, the
other slower and more discriminating.  His model suggests that
the latter process is at work for complex emotions, such as the
pride we feel for Luke’s feat.  Some form of cognition may be
required for some emotions.  Perhaps the complex emotions
involved in the paradox are not the initial sub-cognitive events
but rather their cognitive reappraisal, which takes place shortly
following the initial reaction.[22]  Ekman suggests that certain
“emotional plots,” such as grief, jealousy, and infatuation, do
specify a “particular context within which specific emotions will
be felt by specific persons, casting the actors and what has or
is about to transpire.”[23]  In other words, in order for these
emotional plots to occur, we must recognize ourselves to be in
a certain context.  If we feel pride for Luke it’s because we
recognize that he has done something difficult that is worthy
of praise.  This is an important point, and one to which I will
return momentarily.
This shifts the burden of proof from the hybrid theorists to the
non-cognitivists.  They must be able to explain how we can
undergo complex emotions without requiring thoughts,
judgments, or beliefs.  Most non-cognitivists feel that they are
up to the task.  Here, I will examine one prominent view: the
philosopher Jesse Prinz’s neo-Jamesian theory of emotions.
            3.3.  Prinz’s perception-based theory
LeDoux argues that thoughts are not necessary for all
emotions to occur, a point with which Prinz and other non-
cognitivists would readily agree.  These theories hold that all
emotions have a bodily component, or at least a disposition for
one.  These bodily responses, or our perception of them, are
the emotion.  Historically, such theories follow a Jamesian
theory of emotions, or feeling theory.  James’ argues that an
emotion occurs when we have a perception of a bodily change,
and that “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the
emotion.”[24] Prinz, similarly, identifies emotions as
“perceptions (conscious or unconscious) of patterned changes
in the body.”[25]  In Prinz’s updated Jamesian theory,
perceptions of bodily changes rather than a judgment or belief
are the necessary and sufficient conditions for emotions.  Even
emotions that seem to be cognitively complex, such as guilt or
loneliness, have some sort of bodily response.  A guilt-ridden
person might have a “down-trodden body” or “guilt pangs and
agonies,” along with a “blush of guilt,” downcast eyes, and a
lowered chin.[26]  Long-standing emotions, such as love,
predispose us to “enter into patterned bodily responses.” [27] 
Prinz goes so far as to state, “I would defy the critic of James
and Lange to identify a single emotion that lacks a bodily
mark, at least dispositionally.”[28]
Central to Prinz’s claims about the structure of emotions is the
concept of “core relational themes,” borrowed from the
psychologist Richard Lazarus (1991).  He utilizes this concept
to explain emotion’s intentionality. The core relational themes
involve an organism/environment relation that bears on the
subject’s well-being.  For example, the bodily responses
related to fear result from one’s perception of a threat in one’s
environment.  We feel sorrow when we recognize that we have
lost something.  Prinz argues that we should only consider
bodily feelings as emotions if they involve this kind of core
relational theme between an object and its environment.
 Other bodily feelings, such as hunger and fatigue, do not have
the relation between the organism and its environment, even if
they do bear on its well-being.[29]  Importantly, core
relational themes can be triggered both consciously and
unconsciously, as when we have automatic disgust or fear
reactions that occur before we have a thought about what
causes those reactions.
Prinz’s view may seem plausible in terms of seemingly basic
emotions, such as fear and sadness, which have typical
physiological bodily responses along with the subconscious
affective responses described in Section Two.  But what about
complex emotions?  While Prinz’s explanation of complex
emotions is itself quite complicated, his basic point is simple.
[30]  He argues that we must distinguish between the causes
of emotions and what constitutes them.  Both basic and
complex emotions are bodily perceptions but the causes of
emotions, such as pride and empathy, are typically more
complex than those involved in emotions like fear or sadness.
 In other words, the core relational themes required may need
more information or context than those needed for a basic fear
response.  This would explain why we think that thoughts,
beliefs, or judgments are part of the emotion, when they are
merely the cause of the emotion.
This can apply to emotions about fictions as well.  Non-
cognitivists, such as Prinz, deny the third proposition of the
paradox.  Beliefs are not necessary for emotions.  The
perceived bodily changes that we undergo when exposed to
emotionally-charged stimuli, not our beliefs about them, are
the necessary component.  When watching a film, we may
cover our eyes, clutch our armrests in fear, gnash our teeth or
frown in anger, or smile or cry from joy.  These bodily changes
are obviously real and perceiving them alone constitutes our
emotions.
Does this adequately answer the paradox?  Prinz’s theory
accepts that even automatic responses about fictions that do
not involve a conscious belief, thought, or judgment about a
situation are emotions.  Basic emotions, such as fear and
sorrow, have characteristic core relational themes that trigger
them both in reality and fiction without necessitating a
conscious judgment.  It’s more difficult to see how core
relational themes apply to complex emotions about fictions.
How can we feel guilty about what happens in a fiction or
envious of a fictional character, not just concerned on behalf of
a character with whom we sympathize?  It seems like
appealing to core relational themes just shifts the problem. For
emotions such as pride or empathy, we may need to make a
judgment or have a thought or belief about a situation to
trigger these emotions.  For example, the core relational
theme of guilt involves recognizing that one has “transgressed
a moral imperative,” and envy involves “wanting what
someone else has.”[31]  These judgments, thoughts, or beliefs
need not be conscious but they are still required, and so are
necessary for the emotion to occur. These thoughts,
judgments, and beliefs about our environment are a part of
the processing involved in bringing about certain emotions, in
line with LeDoux’s point about the two emotional pathways
described above.
Again, some form of cognition seems necessary in order to
explain our complex emotions concerning fictions.  Perhaps,
then, a hybrid account of emotions would best solve the
paradox, a theory that does not necessitate a belief,
judgment, or thought for all emotions but only for some. Let’s
consider one approach.
4. Carroll’s thought-theory of emotions
Noël Carroll denies the third proposition of the paradox by
ridding his theory of beliefs, which, he argues, are the
problematic element of the proposition.  Similarly to Walton,
Carroll argues that it is not the fictional world itself towards
which we have an emotional response.  Instead, it is our
thought content about the fiction.  Thoughts, according to this
theory, are the major cognitive constituent of emotions.
Carroll argues that this is beneficial because we can, and do,
have genuine emotions about the contents of our thoughts all
of the time, so we need not propose a theory of make-believe
or some other pretense theory to account for fictions.[32]
The thought-theory hinges on two main points.  The first
concerns the possibility of having emotions about things we
imagine.  Carroll illustrates this point with the following
example:
Standing on a precipice, though in no way precariously, one
might fleetingly entertain the thought of falling over the edge.
 Commonly, this can be accompanied by a sudden chill or
tremor which is brought about, I submit, not by our belief that
we are about to fall over the edge of the precipice, but by our
thought of falling, which, of course, we regard as a particularly
uninviting prospect.  It need not be a prospect we believe is
probable, there is no one around to push us, and we have no
intention of jumping.  But we can scare ourselves by imagining
a sequence of events that we know to be highly unlikely.[33]
It is not the event of our falling that scares us in this situation
but rather the content of our thought:  a mental image or
attitude of the scenario, perhaps.  Carroll argues that this sort
of emotional response happens quite frequently in our
everyday lives and is also what happens when we engage in
fictions.
Secondly, Carroll shows that thoughts do not necessitate
beliefs:  “The thought of a fearsome and disgusting creature
like Dracula is something that can be entertained without
believing that Dracula exists…Thus, if we grant that thought
contents can frighten, then we shall have no problem saying
that standard readers and viewers of fictions about the Count
do not believe the Count exists.”[34]  This point is especially
helpful in solving the paradox.  It is possible to have genuine
emotions about fictions without believing in the existence of
the emotion’s formal object.  The emotions are still intentional
—not about the fiction itself but about our thought content.
 The first two propositions of the paradox hold, but the tricky
third proposition is eliminated.
Perhaps, though, Carroll’s thought-theory is too intellectual.
Many of our emotions about fictions are too instantaneous and
involuntary to involve thought.  Because the thought-theory
does not involve changes in bodily states, one could argue that
it cannot serve as a general theory of emotions. Solomon
argues that the problem with the thought-theory, like the
pure-cognitive theories, is that it excludes bodily changes from
emotions, which we very clearly have.[35] Carroll, however,
does not exclude bodily changes from his account of emotions.
 In his view, both thoughts and bodily changes can constitute
emotions.  Theories such as this are what Prinz calls hybrid
appraisal theories.  The question is, how do the bodily changes
fit into the picture?  Not all of our emotions are based on
thoughts, perhaps not even most, as the two pathways model
shows.  How can a thought-theory explain them, besides
denying that they are emotions to begin with?
Despite these concerns, I think that Carroll has highlighted an
important point in positing a solution to the paradox in terms
of thoughts instead of beliefs.  His theory accounts for our
complex theories of emotions.  Our pride for Luke, for
example, is based on a thought about his trials.  It has also
eliminated the third proposition of the paradox, maintaining
that we have many genuine emotions about fictions. 
Ultimately, though, I agree with Solomon that a thought-
theory cannot serve as a complete theory of emotions about
fictions.  In the next section, I will modify Carroll’s view to one
that is less problematic in light of what LeDoux and others
have taught us about how the emotional process works.
5. HOT emotions
There are two aspects of Carroll’s thought-theory that I
believe need further elucidation. The first has already been
noted. As Carroll understands them, emotions necessarily
involve a cognitive appraisal and bodily change, and the
appraisal causes the bodily change.  But research by LeDoux
and others has shown that bodily changes are not caused by
cognitive appraisals; rather, the perceived bodily change takes
place before the appraisal.  This is not a serious objection to
Carroll; he simply has the order of the emotional process
backwards.  Carroll still seems right in saying that appraisals
have a place in our emotional responses to fictions, especially
the complex emotions, but his view must be expanded to
account for what we now know about how emotions work
physiologically.  Second, we need to get clear on the extent of
our awareness of our thoughts concerning fictions.  Are we
aware of our sorrow over Anna Karenina’s death or our fear of
Dracula?  In other words, are these thoughts conscious?
We find ourselves entering the nebulous realm of emotional
consciousness.  Is this journey really necessary?  Consider
again the problematic emotions we’ve been discussing thus
far:  complex emotions, such as pride and jealousy, which,
while arguably constituted in part by perceived bodily changes,
also seem to require a cognitive appraisal. It’s this appraisal
which I will now attempt to elucidate.  In order to explain how
thoughts may be the cause of an emotion, I utilize a HOT
(higher-order thought) theory.  “HOTs” are common parlance
in consciousness studies, most actively employed by David
Rosenthal in his HOT theory of consciousness.[36]  Basically, a
higher-order thought is a thought about a (first-order) mental
state:  a sensation, belief, another thought, an emotional
state, and so on. Rosenthal describes this as follows:
Sensing is not…the only way we are conscious of things.  We
are also conscious of something when we have a thought
about that thing as being present.  I need not see somebody in
the audience to be conscious of that person; it’s enough just
to have a thought that the person is here.  There is, moreover,
no other way we know about of being conscious of things.  So,
if we are not conscious of our conscious states by sensing
them, the only alternative is that we have thoughts about
them—what I have called elsewhere higher-order
thoughts.[37]
Here Rosenthal raises two important points for our purposes.
 The first has to do with the object of our mental states and is
especially important for understanding the paradox of fiction. 
Rosenthal makes it clear that we can have HOTs about things
that aren’t physically present and that we don’t believe are
physically present.  We can have HOTs about our family
member across the country, about people long-gone, about
hypothetical or counterfactual cases, and even fictional
characters.[38]
The second, more important point has to do with higher-order
awareness of a mental state.  Arguably, a mental state of
which we are not or can never be aware is not a conscious
state.  First-order thoughts are conscious in the sense that we
are awake while they happen, for example, we are awake
while watching a film, and we will always be in some mental
state throughout it, but we are not always aware of that state.
 Basic emotional responses, such as raised blood pressure,
muscular tension, and so on, can take place without one’s
being aware of them; recall that Carroll describes these
reactions as cognitively impenetrable.  In order for the first-
order state, for example, the thought about the film, to be
conscious, we must be aware of it.  Note that we need not be
conscious of our awareness of a state; the HOT itself need not
be conscious. This would involve, Rosenthal argues, a second-
order thought:  a thought about the higher-order thought.
Rosenthal describes these cases as introspection:  “in which
we are deliberately and attentively conscious of our mental
states.”[39]
Rosenthal’s basic line is that we must have a higher-order
awareness (HOA) of a state in order to be conscious of it. HOA
is the key to explaining our complex emotions about fictions.
 The HOT itself is not the emotion; remember that emotions
need not be cognitive or conscious.  I take the same line of
reasoning:  the HOT can cause an emotion by acting as the
intentional object of the emotion.[40]  Recall that, according
to Carroll’s position, an emotion involves an evaluative attitude
towards an internal mental state, rather than towards an
external object or state of affairs. Borrowing Carroll’s example,
I fear the character Dracula in cases where I have an
evaluative attitude about the Count.  The thought that “Count
Dracula is dangerous” is the formal object of my emotion, not
the state of affairs concerning the Count.  We maintain
Carroll’s basic point against the pure-cognitive theory;
emotions do not necessary involve beliefs.  I also, like Carroll,
reject the third proposition of the paradox; according to a HOT
theory we need not have a genuine belief about the existence
of a situation in order to have an emotion about it.
We can also go further and show how complex fictional
emotions fit into a theory of emotions in general.  According to
non-cognitivist theories, we need not be conscious of the
cause of an emotion, and thoughts themselves involve a
cortical reasoning process that is too slow to account for more
basic emotions.  This doesn’t count against a HOT theory,
however.  Not all emotions necessitate thoughts, and not all
emotions must be conscious.  Subcortical responses may have
unconscious causes and never result in thoughts, but they are
still emotions.  Thus, this remains a hybrid theory of emotions
rather than a pure-cognitivist one.  A HOT’s role becomes
apparent for the complex emotions.  Like Ekman, I maintain
that many complex emotions require a similarly complex
emotional-plot in order for the emotion to occur.  I take the
HOTs as the additional step needed to explain the complex
emotions about fictions that comprise the paradox of fiction
and life in general.  The HOTs represent certain environmental
situations and stimuli, something like Prinz’s theory of core
relational themes:  a thought about a moral transgression for
guilt, “fearing the worst but yearning for better” for hope or
“representing a third party for loss of threat to another’s
affection” for jealousy.[41]  In these cases, a HOT is required
for the emotion to occur.  We need to be aware of those
factors in the environment that affect our own well-being and
that of people we care about.  I need to have the thought that
my partner is being a touch too friendly with another woman
in order to feel jealousy; in order to feel pride towards Luke, I
need to first have the conscious thought about Luke’s plight.
In sum, a HOT theory of emotions accounts for a wide range of
our emotional responses to fictions, from the subcortical,
automatic, and unconscious emotions to the complex, rational,
and conscious ones, without denying that they are genuine
emotions.  Like Carroll’s thought theory, a HOT view denies
the third proposition of the paradox of fiction.  We have
myriad emotions about fictions in our daily lives, all of which
are genuine.
6.  Final thoughts
I have argued in this paper that pure-cognitive judgment
theories of emotion cannot solve the paradox of fiction,
despite the assumption by several prominent aestheticians,
nor do these theories suffice as explanations of the nature of
emotions in general.  Because of its adherence to recent
neurological findings, Prinz’s neo-Jamesian theory fares better
in both of these respects, but it needs further elucidation to
account for the problematic complex emotions concerning
fictions.
I propose my own account of narrative emotions as a “best
of,” building from non-cognitivist theories and Carroll’s
thought theory, and modifying both in order to develop a
hybrid account of emotions.  A HOT theory can adequately
solve the perennial paradox of fiction and account for our
intuitions about our emotional responses to fiction:  that we
respond to the complex narrative of a fiction and that these
emotions are appropriate.
As I’ve stressed throughout this paper, emotions about fictions
are a significant part of our daily emotional lives in their own
right.  We watch films, view paintings or sculptures, and listen
to music, and we are moved by them. In fact, having an
emotional experience is one of the primary reasons why we
engage in artworks.  As such, it is important for any theory of
emotions to be able to account for them adequately.[42]
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